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By Bruno Crépon, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, 
and William Parienté *
We report results from a randomized evaluation of a microcredit pro-
gram introduced in rural areas of Morocco in 2006. Thirteen per-
cent of the households in treatment villages took a loan, and none in 
control villages did. Among households identified as more likely to 
borrow, microcredit access led to a significant rise in investment in 
assets used for self-employment activities, and an increase in profit, 
but also to a reduction in income from casual labor. Overall there 
was no gain in income or consumption. We find suggestive evidence 
that these results are mainly driven by effects on borrowers, rather 
than by externalities. (JEL D14, G21, J23, O12, O16, O18)
Several recent randomized evaluations in different countries and contexts have found that granting communities access to microcredit has positive impacts on 
investment in self-employed activities, but no significant impact on overall con-
sumption—or on overall income, when that is measured (Attanasio et al. 2011; 
Augsburg et al. 2013; Banerjee et al. 2013; Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2013; 
Desai, Johnson, and Tarozzi 2013). A plausible interpretation of these findings is 
that the small businesses that the households gaining access to microcredit invest 
in have low marginal product of capital. Consistent with this hypothesis, these 
studies often find no significant impact of microcredit access on business profits 
or income from self-employment activities on average, although several do find an 
impact on profits for preexisting businesses or for businesses at the top end of the 
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distribution of  profits (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2013; Banerjee et al. 2013). 
Since the marginal business funded by a microfinance loan is often more likely to be 
female-operated, this interpretation (that the impact of microcredit on overall profits 
is low because it mainly funds unprofitable businesses) is also consistent with the 
cash-drop literature that finds that while the marginal productivity of capital appears 
to be large for male-run small businesses, it is much lower for those run by women 
(de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008). 
One remaining question about this interpretation, however, is that while the 
impact on average self-employment profit is statistically insignificant in all existing 
studies, the point estimates are generally positive. Moreover, in most studies, the dif-
ferential take-up of microcredit between treatment and control groups is generally 
low, either because interest in microcredit in treatment areas is low or because there 
is also some take-up in the control group (due either to leakage or entry of compet-
itors into the control area). This implies that the insignificantly positive point esti-
mates would translate into large (though still insignificant, obviously) instrumental 
estimates of the impact of microcredit (as opposed to microcredit access) on the 
average business profit. Could it be that the effect on those who take up microcredit 
is actually large, although perhaps imprecisely estimated? 
The studies where microcredit access is randomized at the area level, however, 
generally focus on reporting reduced-form estimates and do not use area-level access 
as an instrument for microcredit. There are good reasons to believe that microcre-
dit availability impacts not only on clients, but also on nonclients through a variety 
of channels: equilibrium effects via changes in wages or in competition, impacts 
on behavior of the mere possibility to borrow in the future, etc. Thus, the exclusion 
restriction—that the instrument only affects the outcome through its impact on micro-
credit borrowing—is likely to be violated, and studies that randomize at the area level 
(rightly) avoid using area-level microcredit access as an instrument. On the other 
hand, in order to maximize power in the face of low demand, most of these studies use 
as the study sample a convenience sample, which surveys people who are eligible and 
likely to borrow based on observables (for example, demographic characteristics or 
prior expression of interest). The results are thus reduced-form estimates on a specific 
population. Furthermore, (with the exception of Desai, Johnson, and Tarozzi 2013) 
identification comes from increased microcredit access in treatment areas (rather than 
no access versus some access), and we are thus not capturing the effect driven by those 
who want microcredit the most (who may borrow both in control and treatment areas). 
In this paper, we present results from a randomized evaluation of microcredit in 
rural areas of Morocco. The study has three features that make it a good comple-
ment to existing papers. First, it takes place in an area where there is absolutely no 
other microcredit penetration, before or after the introduction of the product, and for 
the duration of the study. We are thus capturing the impact on the most interested 
households in villages (although those are still marginal villages for our partner, 
since they were chosen to be at the periphery of their planned zones of operation). 
Second, we designed and implemented a sampling strategy that would give us suf-
ficient power to estimate the impact on borrowers, and also to capture impacts rep-
resentative at the village level. Finally, we propose a strategy to test for externalities 
on nonborrowers, and to estimate direct effect on borrowers. 
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Existing strategies to estimate spillovers, which use two-step randomization (e.g. 
Crépon et al. 2013) are not feasible for this question, first because excluding a sub-
set of potential clients once an office is open would be difficult, and second because 
part of the potential impact of microcredit on nonparticipants would only affect 
those eligible to be clients. We thus propose a simple strategy, based on the different 
probabilities to borrow found by the households that were surveyed, and build this 
strategy explicitly into the sample design. 
The evaluation was implemented in 162 villages, divided into 81 pairs of similar 
villages. The pairs were chosen at the periphery of the zone where Al Amana, our 
partner microfinance institution (MFI), was planning to start their operations. We ran-
domly selected one village in each pair, and Al Amana started working in that village 
only. In a pilot phase, we collected extensive data on a sample of 1,300 house holds 
in 7 pairs of villages (7 treatment, 7 control), before introduction of microcredit. 
Several months after the program was introduced in the pilot villages, we estimated 
a model of credit demand in those villages and selected a small number of variables 
that were correlated with higher take-up. For all the remaining villages, before Al 
Amana started their operation, we conducted a short survey (which included the 
variables correlated to higher take-up) on 100 randomly selected households. We 
then calculated for each household a propensity score to borrow based on our model. 
We interviewed at baseline and endline (two years after rollout) all the households 
in the top quartile of the score (in treatment and control group), plus five households 
randomly selected from the rest of the village. In addition, at endline, we added a 
third group that had an even higher propensity to borrow, by reestimating the take-up 
equation in the whole sample, and using the initial census (available for all house-
holds) to construct a new score. In total, our sample includes 4,465 households at 
baseline, 92 percent of which were successfully interviewed at endline (an unusually 
low attrition rate), and 1,433 new households that were added at endline. 
Our sample thus has three categories of households classified ex ante in terms of 
their probability to borrow. We take advantage of the heterogeneity in the propensity 
to borrow in our sample to test the existence of potential externalities from borrow-
ers to nonborrowers. We evaluate the effect of the treatment on households who have 
a high propensity to borrow and those who have a low probability to borrow. Finding 
no effect on low-propensity households would indicate the absence of externalities 
or other effects of microcredit availability on nonborrowers. Since low-propensity 
households come from both villages with low microcredit take-up (where almost 
everyone has a low propensity to borrow) and villages with higher take-up, our 
estimates on this specific population are likely to capture spillovers from borrowers 
and anticipation effect (impact from the mere fact that microcredit is available). For 
most outcomes we fail to reject that microcredit has no effect on the low-propensity 
sample. Motivated by this evidence, we use a treatment as an instrument for borrow-
ing, the last step of our analysis. 
For consistency with the other papers on microcredit, we first report a complete set 
of reduced-form estimates on the households in the top quartile of ex ante propensity 
to borrow, as well as on households that were added at endline. Even in this sample, 
we find fairly low take-up of microcredit (17 percent in treatment and 0 in con-
trol). Households in treatment villages invest significantly more in  self-employment 
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 activities, particularly agriculture and animal husbandry, which are dominant ones 
(74 percent of the sample engages in either of these activities). We find a significant 
increase in total self-employment profit, on average, but the effect appears to be 
very heterogeneous. In particular, the effect on profits is significantly positive at 
the higher quantiles of profitability (as in other studies) but significantly negative 
at the lower quantiles. The moderate increase in self-employment income is offset 
by a decrease in employment income, which comes from a drop in labor supplied 
outside the farm or household business. Overall, income increases (insignificantly) 
and consumption declines slightly (again, this is insignificant). Finally, similarly to 
other studies, we find a significant decline in nonessential expenditures (expendi-
tures on festivals), but no change in any of the other “social outcomes” often meant 
to be affected by microcredit. 
We then present, for our key variables, estimates of the impact of making micro-
credit available in a village on the population as a whole. We do this by using our 
entire endline sample and applying the sampling probability in order to appropri-
ately weight the observations. The bottom line is similar. Not surprisingly, take-up 
of microcredit is even smaller in this sample: 13 percent. Yet, the relatively small 
difference between the average household and one determined to be “high prob-
ability” underscores how difficult it is to predict who will take up microcredit. 
Correspondingly, the impact on most variables of interest is also smaller. However, 
even at the population level, we find that microcredit access significantly increases 
sales and expenditures in the business (however there is now a negative and insignif-
icant effect on profits). We also find significant declines in labor supplied outside the 
home and salary income, and an insignificant decrease in consumption. 
As we mentioned, our test of externality fails to reject the hypothesis of no exter-
nality, on every variable considered individually except for two (labor supply out-
side the home and income). Of course, a caveat could be the lack of statistical power. 
We nevertheless move on to present an instrumental variable estimate of the impact 
of microcredit, using a dummy for being in a treatment village as an instrument for 
take-up. This essentially scales up our previous estimates, and gives us a sense of 
what the relatively modest reduced-form impact at the village level (or for likely 
borrowers) implies for those who actually borrow. On average, the point estimate 
suggests roughly a 50 percent increase in asset holding, a doubling of sales, and a 
more than doubling of profits. Labor outside the home declines by about 50 percent 
both in terms of earnings and hours supplied. 
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that our profit estimates imply an 
average return to microcredit capital in terms of business profit of around 140 per-
cent, not taking into account interest payments. Given this appealing figure, why 
aren’t more people taking out loans? One possible reason is that, according to our 
estimates, the impacts of credit on profits are very heterogeneous. We present coun-
terfactual distributions for profits among compliers based on Imbens and Rubin 
(1997): 25 percent of the compliers in the treatment groups have negative profits, 
while almost no one in the control group does. Given this risk level, it is plausible 
that individuals do not fully know what kind of returns to expect and are therefore 
hesitant to borrow. Another possibility is that profits do not capture welfare improve-
ment. We observe no change in total income and consumption and a drop in hours 
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worked outside the home. We do not observe a significant increase in labor supply 
in the household business, but the confidence interval does not rule out a relatively 
large increase, and it is plausible that labor in the business was not adequately mea-
sured, or that the hours spent taking care of a larger business are more stressful for 
the households. (Otherwise, it would suggest that the entire increase in total income 
due to microcredit is spent on leisure, which seems somewhat implausible given that 
households do not work very many hours to start with.) 
Overall, our study confirms the key finding from other research: even in an envi-
ronment with very little access to credit, the aggregate impact of microcredit on the 
population at large is fairly limited, at least in the short term. This holds true even for 
those who are most predisposed to borrow. We can reject that household consump-
tion increased by more than 10 percent monthly among those who take up a loan. But 
our study reveals that, at least in this context, these lackluster impacts appear to result 
from the combination of several offsetting factors. First, the take-up is low, even in 
these rural areas of Morocco where there is essentially no formal credit alternative. 
Second, among those who take up, there are proportionally large average impacts 
on self-employment investments, sales, and profits although there also appears to 
be great heterogeneity in these effects. Third, in the Moroccan context, those gains 
are offset by correspondingly large declines in employment income, stemming from 
substantial decline in labor supplied outside the household. Thus, some households 
choose to take advantage of microcredit to change, in pretty significant ways, the way 
their lives are organized. But even these borrowers do not appear to choose microcre-
dit as a means to increase their standard of living, at least in the relatively short run. 
I. Context and Evaluation
A. Al Amana’s rural credit Program
With about 307,000 active clients and a portfolio of 1,944 million Moroccan 
dirhams or MAD (US$235 million) as of December 2012, Al Amana is the larg-
est microfinance institution in Morocco. Since the start of its activities in 2000, 
Al  Amana expanded from urban areas, into peri-urban and then to rural areas. 
Between 2006 and 2007, Al Amana opened around 60 new branches in nondensely 
populated areas. Each branch has a well-defined catchment area served by credit 
agents permanently assigned to the branch.1
The main product Al Amana offers in rural areas is a group liability loan. Groups 
are formed by three to four members who agree to mutually guarantee the reim-
bursement of their loans. Loan amounts range from 1,000 to 15,000 MAD (US$124 
to US$1,855) per member. It can take 3 to 18 months to reimburse loans, through 
payments made weekly, twice a month, or monthly. For animal husbandry activities, 
a two-month grace period is granted. Interest rates on rural loans ranged between 
12.5 percent and 14.5 percent at the time of the study (i.e. between 2006 and 2009). 
1 A map is established and approved by Al Amana headquarters before the branch is opened, specifying the 
exact area, and therefore villages, that are eligible to be served by the branch. An intervention area can consist of 
one to six rural communities, and several villages belong to a community. 
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To be eligible for a group liability loan, the applicant must be between 18 and 
70 years old, hold a national ID card, have a residency certificate, and have been run-
ning an economic activity other than nonlivestock agriculture for at least 12 months. 
Unlike most MFIs worldwide, Al Amana does not restrict its loans to women exclu-
sively, but it does generally require that credit agents have at least 35 percent of 
women among their clients. However, this requirement was first removed among the 
branches participating in the study and then among all branches. 
From March 2008, individual loans for housing and nonagricultural businesses 
were also introduced in rural areas. These loans were larger (up to 48,000 MAD, or 
about US$6,000), had an additional set of requirements, and were targeted at clients 
that could provide some sort of collateral. During our period of focus, households 
almost only took out group liability loans, so this study is primarily an evaluation 
of that product. 
B. Experimental Design and Data collection
The design of our study tracked the expansion of Al Amana into nondensely 
populated areas between 2006 and 2007. Before each branch was opened, data was 
collected from at least six villages located on the periphery of the intervention areas—
villages that could either have been included or excluded in the branch’s catchment 
area. Villages that were close to a rural population center or along a route to other 
areas served by the branch were excluded, as this would have disrupted Al Amana’s 
development. A very small number of villages where other MFIs were present (around 
2 percent) were also excluded. Selected villages were then matched in pairs based on 
observable characteristics (number of households, accessibility to the center of the 
community, existing infrastructure, type of activities carried out by the households, 
type of agriculture activities). On average, two pairs per branch were kept for the 
evaluation. In each pair, one village was randomly assigned to treatment, and the other 
to control. In total, 81 pairs belonging to 47 branches were included in the evaluation. 
Between 2006 and 2007, Al Amana opened new branches in six phases. These 
branches were opened throughout rural Morocco.2 For the purposes of our evaluation, 
we divided this expansion into four periods, and conducted the baseline survey in four 
waves of field operations between April 2006 and December 2007. Our sampling 
strategy followed a novel approach to maximize the evaluation’s power to detect both 
direct and population-level effects of microfinance access. Specifically, we selected 
two samples of households: one containing those with the highest probability to 
become clients of the microfinance institution and one containing a random selection 
of households from the rest of the population. Using the first sample increases the 
probability to detect an effect on those who are the most likely to become clients, if 
there is one. Using both samples together, with appropriate weights, allows us to mea-
sure the effect on the whole population of offering access to microfinance services. 
2 Our sample is spread throughout rural areas of the entire country. Opened branches, 47 in total, are located in 
27 provinces belonging to 11 regions (out of a total of 16 regions in the country) and cover all main dialects spoken 
in the country. Figure B1 in the online Appendix shows the spatial distribution of Al Amana branches participating 
of the study. 
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To this end, in each of the 14 villages of the first wave, we sampled 100 households 
to whom we administered a full baseline survey. In villages of fewer than 100 house-
holds, we surveyed them all. This wave took place in April–May 2006, six months 
before the scheduled launch of the second wave. We used data from this survey and 
administrative data on credit take-up in treatment villages over the first six months 
(reported weekly by credit agents) to estimate a model to predict the likeliness to 
borrow for each household. We present the result of this model in Appendix Table A1. 
Based on this model, we designed a short survey instrument including the key vari-
ables predicting a higher likelihood to borrow.3 For each of the subsequent waves, 
we started by administering this short survey to a random sample of 100 households 
in each village (or all the households if the village had fewer than 120). We entered 
survey data on computers on site, and an Excel macro selected the top quartile of 
households predicted to be the most likely to borrow on the basis of the model, as 
well as five additional households from the rest of the population. We administered 
the full baseline survey to this sample. 
The baseline survey included questions on assets, investment, and production 
in agriculture, animal husbandry, nonagricultural self-employment activities, labor 
supply of all household members (hours and sectors), as well as a detailed con-
sumption survey. Since microcredit aims to have broad impacts on behavior and 
well being, we also included questions on education, health, and women’s decision 
making power in the households. 
After the baseline survey was completed in each wave, one treatment and one 
control village were randomly assigned within each pair. In treatment villages, 
credit agents started to promote microcredit and to provide loans immediately after 
the baseline survey.4 They visited villages once a week and performed various pro-
motional activities: door-to-door campaigns, meetings with current and potential 
clients, contact with village associations, cooperatives, and women’s centers, etc. 
Two years after the start of each wave of the Al Amana intervention, we conducted 
an endline household survey, based on the same instrument, in the same 81 pairs of 
villages (May 2008–January 2010), and 4,465 households interviewed at baseline 
were sampled for endline.5 Of them, 92 percent (4,118 households) were found 
and interviewed again. To maximize power, an additional 1,433 households (also 
predicted to have a high probability to borrow based on the credit model and the 
data from the short-form survey) were sampled at endline. To select these  additional 
3 The variables collected in this short survey were the following: household size, number of members older than 
18, number of self-employment activities, number of members with trading or services or handicraft as main activ-
ity, gets a pension, distance to souk (in km), does trading as self-employment activity, has a fiber mat, has a radio, 
owns land, rents land, does crop-sharing, number of olive and argan trees, bought agriculture productive assets over 
the past 12 months, uses sickle, uses rake (in agriculture), number of cows bought over the past 12 months, phone 
expenses over the past month (in MAD), clothes expenses over the past month (in MAD), had an outstanding 
formal loan over the past 12 months, would be ready to form a four-person group and guarantee a loan mutually, 
amount that would be able to reimburse monthly (in MAD), would take out a loan of 3,000 MAD to be repaid in 
nine monthly installments of 400 MAD. 
4 By the time of the baseline survey, branches were fully operational and were conducting business in the center 
of their catchment areas (within a 5 km radius of the branch location). Once the baseline survey was completed, 
credit agents started to cover the whole branch catchment area, with the only exception of control villages. 
5 In wave 1 villages, we kept for the analysis 25 percent of households with a high probability to borrow, plus 
five households chosen randomly. 
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households, we reestimated the model to predict the likelihood to borrow for each 
household using administrative data on who borrowed by the time of the endline 
survey (i.e. over the two years of the evaluation time frame), matched with data 
collected with the short-form survey before the rollout of microcredit (and, hence, 
not affected by the rollout), updated the dependent variables including clients over 
the two-year period, and reestimated the coefficients of the model. This allowed us 
to much better identify likely borrowers.6 Thus, the endline household survey was 
conducted, in total, with 5,551 households.7
C. Potential Threat to Experiment integrity
The experimental design was generally well respected, and we observe essen-
tially no entry of Al Amana (or any other MFI, as it turns out) in the control group.8 
Villagers did not travel to other branches to get loans either. 
Attrition was not a major concern in the experiment since 92 percent of the house-
holds in the baseline were found at endline. (Attrition is slightly higher in the treat-
ment group at 8.6 percent, compared to 6.8 percent in control; see Table 1, panel B.) 
Tables B3 and B4 in the online Appendix compare attrition in the treatment and the 
control groups, and examine the characteristics of the attritors compared to nonat-
tritors. Table B3 focuses on attrition of the baseline sample, while Table B4 uses the 
short-form survey to examine attrition in the full endline sample (including house-
holds that were not included at baseline). Attritors belong to smaller households with 
younger household heads, and are less likely to have a self-employment activity. 
We then look at whether attritors’ characteristics differ between the treatment and 
control groups (panel C of Tables B3 and B4). We find only two characteristics that 
differs for attritors in treatment villages (they are relatively more likely to run a 
self-employment activity and less likely to borrow from other formal institutions). 
Next, we examine balance between treatment and control. Table 1 provides means 
in the control group and the treatment-control difference for the variables collected 
in the baseline survey of 4,465 households. In Table B1 and B2, we reproduce the 
same analysis for the whole sample of 5,898 households and for the 4,934 house-
holds with high probability to borrow. 
Unfortunately, there are some differences between the treatment and control 
groups, more than would be expected by pure chance (although we know that the 
6 Note that the sample is still selected using a linear combination of variables collected at baseline (the same in 
treatment and control villages) and is therefore not endogenous to the treatment. 
7 Out of the 5,551, to remove obvious outliers without risking cherry-picking, we trimmed 0.5 percent of obser-
vations using the following mechanical rule: for each of the main continuous variables of our analysis (total loan 
amount, Al Amana loan amount, other MFI loan amount, other formal loan amount, utility company loan amount, 
informal loan amounts, total assets, productive assets of each of the three self-employment activities, total production, 
production of each of the three self-employment activities, total expenses, expenses of each of the three self-employ-
ment activities, income from employment activities, and monthly household consumption), we computed the ratio of 
the value of the variable and the ninetieth percentile of the variable distribution. We then computed the maximum ratio 
over all the variables for each household and we trimmed 0.5 percent of households with the highest ratios. Analysis 
is thus conducted over 5,424 observations instead of the original 5,551, and no further trimming is done in the data. 
8 A few of the originally selected pairs of treatment and control villages were removed from the sample 
early on—before data collection—because it turned out that the treatment and control villages were served by 
another Al Amana branch. A few more were removed because Al Amana decided not to operate in their area at all. 
Implementation was done effectively and according to plan in the rest of the sample. 
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Control group Treatment - Control
Obs. Obs. Mean SD Coeff. p-value
Panel A. Baseline household sample
Household composition:
Number members 4,465 2,266 5.14 2.70 0.04 0.583
Number adults (>=16 years old) 4,465 2,266 3.45 1.99 0.03 0.564
Number children (<16 years old) 4,465 2,266 1.68 1.65 0.01 0.859
Male head 4,465 2,266 0.935 0.246 0.001 0.813
Head age 4,465 2,266 48 16 1** 0.012
Head with no education 4,465 2,266 0.615 0.487 −0.013 0.353
Access to credit:
Loan from Al Amana 4,465 2,266 0.007 0.084 −0.003 0.425
Loan from other formal institution 4,465 2,266 0.060 0.238 0.030** 0.023
Informal loan 4,465 2,266 0.068 0.251 0.023*** 0.006
Electricity or water connection loan 4,465 2,266 0.156 0.363 0.013 0.523
Amount borrowed from (in MAD):
Al Amana 4,465 2,266 34 460 −13 0.534
Other formal institution 4,465 2,266 355 2,340 92 0.188
Informal loan 4,465 2,266 248 2,248 −8 0.880
Electricity or water entities 4,465 2,266 528 1,370 22 0.758
Self-employment activities
Number activities 4,465 2,266 1.6 1.2 0.0 0.435
Farms 4,465 2,266 0.599 0.490 0.017 0.321
 Investment 4,465 2,266 13 72 0 0.775
 Sales 4,465 2,266 9,335 36,981 −392 0.665
 Expenses 4,465 2,266 3,369 8,428 266 0.241
 Savings 4,465 2,266 1,271 3,505 −77 0.433
 Employment 4,465 2,266 22 95 −1 0.477
 Self-employment 4,465 2,266 61 102 5 0.122
Does animal husbandry 4,465 2,266 0.533 0.499 0.042** 0.027
 Investment 4,465 2,266 397 1,912 67 0.2
 Sales 4,465 2,266 3,444 8,831 339 0.184
 Expenses 4,465 2,266 4,111 10,897 386 0.206
 Savings 4,465 2,266 10,249 17,032 1,066* 0.050
 Employment 4,465 2,266 7 49 −1 0.272
 Self-employment 4,465 2,266 111 158 7 0.215
Runs a non-farm business 4,465 2,266 0.217 0.412 −0.034** 0.011
Number activities managed by women 4,465 2,266 0.218 0.585 0.004 0.750
Share of HH activities managed by women 4,465 2,266 0.160 0.367 0.007 0.466
Distance to souk 4,125 2,077 20.1 25.2 0.2 0.87
Has income from:
Self-employment activity 4,465 2,266 0.780 0.414 −0.016 0.163
Day labor/salaried 4,465 2,266 0.580 0.494 −0.016 0.194
risks:
Lost more than 50 percent of the harvest 4,125 2,077 0.106 0.308 0.004 0.642
Lost more than 50 percent of the livestock 4,125 2,077 0.030 0.172 0.003 0.606
Lost any livestock over the past 12 months 4,465 2,266 0.189 0.392 0.029** 0.012
HH member illness, death,
 and/or house sinister
4,465 2,266 0.218 0.413 0.013 0.168
consumption:
Consumption (in MAD) 4,465 2,266 2,272 1,349 28 0.440
Non-durables consumption (in MAD) 4,465 2,266 2,227 1,295 20 0.559
Durables consumption (in MAD) 4,465 2,266 45 236 8 0.231
HH is poor 4,465 2,266 0.247 0.431 0.002 0.858
Panel B. Attrition
Not surveyed at endline 4,465 2,266 0.068 0.252 0.018** 0.018
notes: Unit of observation: household. Panel A and B: sample includes all households surveyed at baseline.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Baseline household survey
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 randomization was well done, since it was carried out in our office, by computer). 
Jointly, these baseline characteristics are different in the treatment and control 
groups. At baseline, households in treatment villages had, on average, a slightly 
larger access to financial services, but not larger loans. They had higher probability 
to be engaged in livestock activity in treatment villages, and, hence, larger assets, 
and lower probability to run a nonfarm business. As a result of these imbalances, we 
include individual-level control variables in our analysis, and present a robustness 
check without such control variables in the Appendix. Our results are not sensitive 
to control variables. 
II. Reduced-Form Results
For consistency with the other papers in the literature, we first report a set of 
reduced-from results on the sample of likely borrowers (the top quartile of house-
holds selected to be most likely to borrow). We then turn to population-level esti-
mates, and estimates of the impact of the treatment on the treated. 
A. Specification
We estimate the following reduced-form specification: 
(1)   y pij = α + β T pi +  X pij  δ +  ∑ 
m=1
 
p
 γ m 1(p = m) +  ω ij ,
where  p denotes the village pair,  i the village, and  j the household.  T pi is a dummy 
for the introduction of microcredit in village  i , and  y pij is an outcome for household  j 
in village  i in pair  p .  X pij is a vector of control variables.9 The regression includes the 
81 pair dummies represented by  ∑ m=1 p γ m 1(p = m) . Standard errors are clustered at 
the village level. 
Equation (1) is estimated on two different samples. The first is the sample of 
households more likely to become clients of the microfinance institution (see 
Section IIB). In Section IIIA, we also present estimation results obtained using the 
whole sample, using sampling weights to obtain results representative of the whole 
village population. As we evaluate the effect of microcredit on a large number of 
outcomes, we account for multiple hypothesis testing. Each table of results we pres-
ent focuses on a specific family of outcomes for which we produce (in the last 
column) an index (which is the average of the z-scores of each outcome within the 
family). Furthermore we report both the standard p-value and the p-value adjusted 
for multiple hypotheses testing across all the indexes.10 For a reduced set of out-
come variables (and still for the sample of likely borrowers), we also consider the 
9 The basic set of covariates for most of our regression includes the number of household members, number of 
adults, head age, does animal husbandry, does other nonagricultural activity, had an outstanding loan over the past 
12 months, household spouse responded the survey, and other household member (excluding the head) responded 
the survey. Since part of the sample includes households that were only included at endline, we do not have baseline 
information for them. In regressions, we enter a dummy variable identifying them and set to zero the other covari-
ates. We present in online Appendix Table B7 regression results in which no covariates are introduced and a table 
in which an extended set is considered.
10 We adjust p-values following Hochberg (1988) in order to control the familywise error rate (FWER). 
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corresponding quantile regressions. To perform the regression we follow Chamberlain 
(1994) and simply  compute the desired quantiles of the considered outcome vari-
able in each village and then implement minimum distance estimation, explaining 
the different estimated quantiles by the treatment variable and pair dummy vari-
ables. We consider quantiles 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90 percent. 
B. Access to credit
Table 2 presents the results on credit access and borrowing. As in previous studies 
(Banerjee et al. 2013; Karlan and Zinman 2010), we find that households tend to 
underreport borrowing: administrative data suggest that 17 percent of households in 
this sample borrow in the treatment villages (and none in the control villages), while 
in survey data only 11 percent of households admit to borrowing.
The administrative data is more reliable in this context, and this is what we will 
use for the first stage in our instrumental variable regressions below. Access to any 
other form of formal credit is very limited. In the control villages, 2 percent of house-
holds report borrowing from another MFI, 2 percent from another bank, and 2 per-
cent from any other formal source. Only 6 percent report borrowing from  informal 
Table 2—Credit
Al Amana - 
Admin data
Al Amana - 
Survey data
Other
MFI
Other 
Formal
Utility 
company Informal Total
Loan 
repayment
Index of 
dependent 
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. credit accessa
Treated village 0.167 0.090 −0.006 0.007 0.017 −0.003 0.076 0.129
(0.012)***(0.010)*** (0.004) (0.003)** (0.017) (0.007) (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
Control mean 0.000 0.022 0.023 0.016 0.157 0.059 0.247 0.000
Hochberg-corrected p-value 0.000
Panel B. Loan amounts (in MAD)b
Treated village 795 −13 356 180 −112 1,206 33
(103)*** (34) (181)* (89)** (169) (290)*** (13)**
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
Control mean 180 124 519 566 493 1,882 42
notes: Observation unit: household. Sample includes households with high probability-to-borrow score surveyed 
at endline, after trimming 0.5 percent of observations (3,525 who got both a full baseline and endline household 
survey administered, plus an additional 1,409 households who got only the full endline survey administered). (See 
Section 3 for an explanation of sample strategy.) Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS 
regression of the variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables 
specified below. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Controls include: number of household mem-
bers, number of adults, head age, does animal husbandry, does other non-agricultural activity, had an outstanding 
loan over the past 12 months, HH spouse responded to the survey, and other HH member (excluding the HH head) 
responded to the survey. Column 9: the dependent variable consists of an index of z-scores of the outcome variables 
in columns 2–8 (including both credit access and loan amounts) following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). p-val-
ues for this regression are reported using Hochberg’s correction method.
a  Column 1–8: dummy variable equal to 1 if the households had an outstanding loan over the 12 months prior 
to the survey. 
b Sum of outstanding loans (in MAD) over the 12 months prior to the survey.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Column 1: Al Amana administrative data. Columns 2–9: Endline household survey
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sources though this may be underestimated to the extent that households do not like 
to admit to borrowing (as it is frowned upon by Islam), or to the extent that informal 
loans between villagers are recorded as gifts. The only common source of loans 
is the utility companies: 16 percent of households in control villages borrow from 
a utility  company to finance their electricity or water and sanitation installation. 
The pattern is very similar in treatment villages, except that households report 1pp 
more borrowing from other formal sources (there may be some confusion between 
these other sources and Al Amana, partially accounting for the underreporting of Al 
Amana loans). Therefore microfinance was introduced by Al Amana in our treat-
ment villages in a context where households had very limited alternative access to 
finance. This is a unique feature that sets our study apart from most other impact 
evaluations of access to microfinance. 
Turning to loan amounts, households in treatment villages report additional out-
standing loans of 795 MAD (US$96), on average, from Al Amana over the 12 months 
prior the survey.11 There are also small but significant increases in reported amounts 
borrowed from both other formal credit sources and the utility companies, as well as 
a small insignificant substitution with informal loans, which might be related to con-
fusion between various types of loans, as previously mentioned. In total, average out-
standing loan amount increases by 1,206 MAD and repayment per month increases 
by 33 MAD, as reported by households in treatment villages. Online Appendix 
Table B5 uses administrative data to provide some characteristics of the loans dis-
bursed by Al Amana in treatment villages. According to this administrative data, 
clients in treatment villages borrowed, on average, 10,571 MAD. This compares 
to outstanding loan amounts of 8,863 MAD as declared in our survey data.12 Thus, 
households underreport borrowing both on the extensive and the intensive margins. 
In terms of other loan characteristics, clients most often form groups of four people 
who act as mutual guarantors and reimburse their loans in 12 or 18 monthly install-
ments. The average client household took up a loan 5.7 months after microcredit 
was made available in the village and 50 percent of them took a second loan by the 
end of the two-year evaluation timeframe. Most of loans were taken within the first 
six months (67.9 percent). When applying for microcredit, most of clients (68 per-
cent) declared to be planning to use the loan in animal husbandry activities, mainly 
cattle and sheep rising, 26.4 percent in trade-related businesses, and the remaining 
5.5 percent in other nonagricultural businesses, such as services and handicraft. It is 
not surprising that no client declared an intent to allocate loans to other agricultural 
activities (crops and fruit trees), as Al Amana did not lend for such activities. 
C. income Levels and composition, and Labor Allocation
Table 3 shows the impact of the introduction of microcredit on self-employment 
activities. Eighty-three percent of the households in the control group have some 
11 Average outstanding loans of 975 MAD (795 + 180) represent 2.7 percent of average household annual con-
sumption in the control group. If we consider loan amounts declared by actual borrowers in our survey, this share 
increases to 24 percent of annual consumption. 
12 This amount can be directly deduced from information in Table 2 as (795 + 180)/(0.09 + 0.02) = 8863. 
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form of self-employment activity—the dominant forms being animal husbandry and 
 agriculture—whereas only 14.7 percent of households have a nonfarm business (see 
online Appendix Table B6). 
The results of Table 3 suggest that the introduction of microcredit leads to a 
significant expansion of the existing self-employment activities in agriculture and 
animal husbandry, but does not help start new activities. We even find a small non-
significant reduction in self-employment of 1.5 percentage points for the households 
in treated villages. 
Access to microfinance has a positive effect on assets: the estimated impact is 
1,448 MAD. We do not find any effect of microcredit on investments over the last 
12 months, probably because most additional investments caused by the new access 
to microfinance took place in the first year of the intervention (since most loans were 
disbursed in the first 6 months), thus more than 12 months before the endline. 
Figure 1 shows that quantile treatment effects on asset accumulation are posi-
tive at almost all quantiles. Assets of self-employment activities mainly consist of 
animals (cows or goats) owned by the households. Additional results reported in 
Table B6 show that the impact on the stock of assets mainly comes from livestock 
activities. This building up of assets could correspond to business investment strat-
egy (the assets representing unrealized profits), or to a self-insurance mechanism 
(the assets are in-kind savings), or to a combination of the two. 
One other important result in Table 3 is that, summed across all types of activ-
ities, there is a significant expansion in self-employment activities (which comes 
from existing activity since there is no impact on the extensive margin): revenues, 
Table 3—Self-Employment Activities: Revenues, Assets, and Profits
Assets
Sales and
home 
consumption Expenses
Of which: 
Investment Profit 
Has a self- 
employment 
activity
Index of 
dependent 
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated village 1,448 6,061 4,057 −224 2,005 −0.015 0.029
(658)** (2,167)*** (1,721)** (223) (1,210)* (0.010) (0.015)**
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
Control mean 15,984 30,450 21,394 1,529 9,056 0.832 0.000
Hochberg-corrected 
 p-value
0.233
notes: Observation unit: household. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of the 
variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified below. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2. Definitions: Column 1 Sum of assets 
owned in the three activities, including the stock of livestock; column 2 Total Production = sum of agricultural, 
livestock, and non-agricultural business production over the 12 months prior to the survey. Production includes both 
sales and self-consumption. Agricultural production also includes stock; column 3 Sum of labor, inputs, rent and 
investment in all three activities, purchased over the 12 months prior to the survey; column 4 Sum of productive 
assets purchased over the 12 months prior to the survey. Animal husbandry assets include the purchases of livestock; 
column 5 Profit = column 2–column 3; column 6 Variable equals 1 if the HH ran a self-employment activity over 
the 12 months prior to the survey; column 7 The dependent variable consists of an index of z-scores of the outcome 
variables in columns 1–6 following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). p-values for this regression are reported using 
Hochberg’s correction method.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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expenditures, and profit all significantly increase. Profit, defined as the difference 
between revenues and expenses, increases by 2,005 MAD, a substantial amount 
compared to the average profit in the control group, 9,056 MAD. Figure 1  presents 
the results of quantile regressions. It shows that quantile  treatment effects are sig-
nificantly negative for the lowest quantile (0.10), nonsignificant at the median, and 
significantly positive for the quantiles 75 and 90. The finding that the increase in 
self-employment activity is concentrated at the highest quartile echoes Banerjee et 
al. (2013) and Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman (2013). Negative profits at the low 
end of the distribution might be partially due to long-term investments misclassified 
as current expenses. These quantile treatment effects are only reduced forms: they 
do not necessarily mean that the impact of getting credit itself has the same hetero-
geneity (since there may be externalities, and we do not know where the compliers 
lie in the distribution of outcomes). We return to this question in Section IIIC. 
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Figure 1. Quantile Regression (ITT) 
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Table 4 shows the impact of microcredit on different sources of income. The 
major result in this table is that the increase in self-employment profit is offset by a 
significant decrease in employment income. 
Note that, despite the fact that 83 percent of households have a self-employ-
ment activity, employment income accounts for as much as 56.9 percent of house-
hold income while self-employment activities account for only 32.7 percent. Most 
(90 percent) of employment income comes from casual (day) labor and very little 
from stable salaried work (10 percent). The effect of access to microfinance is quite 
substantial, −1,050 MAD, a reduction of 6.7 percent compared to the control group 
mean. As a result of the reduction in wage earnings, the net increase of employ-
ment and self-employment income taken together is small and insignificant. Thus, 
it appears that, in this context, microfinance access leads to a change in the mix of 
activities, but no income growth overall. 
Table 5 reports on the effect of the introduction of microcredit on the time worked 
by household members aged 6 to 65 over the past 7 days, for various age ranges. 
Column 1 shows that there is an insignificant reduction in the total amount of 
hours of labor supplied, and columns 2–4 show there is substitution between the 
different types of activities. Considering all members together, we find a significant 
reduction in work outside the home of 2.8 hours, or 8.3 percent of the control group 
mean. Time spent on self-employment activities increases, but not significantly so. 
Overall, hours of work decline in every age group, although the reduction is signifi-
cant only for the youth (16 to 20) and the elderly (51 to 65). 
The reduction in labor supplied outside the home is consistent with the results 
on employment income (Table 4). The relatively small increase in time spent on 
self-employment activities despite increased investment may be due to the fact that 
Table 4—Income
HH income, over the past 12 months, from:
Total
Self-employment, 
daily labor,  
and salaried
Self-
employment 
activities
Day labor 
and 
salaried
Household 
asset sales Other
Index of 
dependent 
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. income (in MAD)
Treated village 447 954 2,005 −1,050 −679 171 0.000
(1,342) (1,267) (1,210)* (478)** (262)** (233) (0.017)
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
Control mean 27,669 24,804 9,056 15,748 709 2,157 0.000
Hochberg-corrected 
 p-value
0.981
notes: Observation unit: household. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of the 
variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified below. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2. Definitions: column 3: income equals 
total profit from the self-employment activity; column 7: the dependent variable consists of an index of z-scores of 
the outcome variables in columns 1–6 following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). p-values for this regression are 
reported using Hochberg’s correction method.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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investments in agriculture and animal husbandry may not need to be coupled with 
a proportional increase in labor input. Still, this is a remarkable fact: the average 
quantity of labor (24 hours per week) supplied per adult household member seems 
relatively low, suggesting that members may have the opportunity to increase their 
Table 5—Time Worked by HH Members
Hours worked by household members 
over the past seven daysa
Number 
of HH 
members
Index of 
dependent 
variablesTotal
Of which:
Self-
employment 
activities
Outside 
activities Chores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household members 6–65 years old
Treated village −3.3 1.1 −2.8 −1.6
(2.5) (1.5) (1.1)*** (1.0)*
Control mean 143.1 46.9 33.8 62.3 5.2 
Household members 6–15 years old
Treated village −0.5 0.5 0.2 −1.3
(0.7) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4)***
Control mean 19.2 6.3 3.4 9.4 1.4 
Household members 16–20 years old
Treated village −1.4 −0.2 −1.3 0.1
(0.8)* (0.4) (0.4)*** (0.4)
Control mean 21.6 6.6 5.5 9.6 0.8 
Household members 21–50 years old
Treated village −0.5 1.1 −1.5 0.0
(1.5) (0.8) (0.8)** (0.6)
Control mean 84.4 26.3 21.9 36.3 2.5 
Household members 51–65 years old
Treated village −1.2 −0.5 −0.3 −0.4
(0.6)** (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Control mean 18.2 8.1 3.1 7.0 0.6 
Observations 4,918 4,918 4,918 4,918 4,918
index
Treated village −0.017
(0.010)*
Observations 4,918
Control mean 0.000
Hochberg-corrected p-value 0.320
notes: Observation unit: household. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of the 
variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified below. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2. Column 6: the dependent variable con-
sists of an index of z-scores of the outcome variables in all panels of columns 1–4 following Kling, Liebman, and 
Katz (2007). p-values for this regression are reported using Hochberg’s correction method.
a Sum of hours worked by household members over the past 7 days in self-employment, outside activities and 
housework. Households were asked at endline survey about the # of hours worked by each HH member over 
the past 7 days.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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efforts by a large margin (provided that we measure time allocation correctly). This 
would suggest that households take the opportunity of access to credit to invest in 
less labor-intensive occupations and increase their leisure time. 
D. consumption
Table 6 reports the estimated effects of the introduction of microcredit on house-
hold consumption (expenditure and consumption of home production are both 
included). The table shows the effect on total consumption at the household level 
(column 1), and by type of consumption expenditures: durables, nondurables, food, 
health, etc. (columns 2 to 8). 
Consistent with the lack of effect of overall income, we find a small, negative, 
and insignificant point estimate on consumption (46 MAD per month). This absence 
of effect on consumption is confirmed by quantile treatment effect presented in 
Figure 1, which shows no effect at any quantile. 
Turning to the composition of consumption, we do not find the increase in dura-
ble consumption that other papers have reported, but this may be due to the fact that 
the survey was administered more than 12 months after most people got the loans. 
Consistent with all the other papers, we find a statistically significant reduction in 
nonessential expenditures (in this case, festivals, rather than other temptation goods). 
E. Education and Female Empowerment
The impact of microfinance is supposed to go beyond the expansion of busi-
ness activity and consumption levels. Indirect effects, such as the empowerment of 
women and improvements in the health status and education levels of children, are 
often considered potential impacts of microfinance. 
Table 6—Consumption
Monthly household consumption (in MAD) in:
Index
of 
dependent 
variablesTotal Durables
Non-
durables Food Health Education 
Temptation 
and 
entertainment
Festivals
and 
celebrations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treated village −46 18 −63 3 3 −1 −6 −39 −0.015
(47) (16) (44) (23) (5) (1) (6) (12)*** (0.015)
Observations 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924
Control mean 3,057 64 2,993 1,784 46 24 298 425 0.000
Hochberg-corrected 
 p-value
0.938
notes: Observation unit: household. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of the 
variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified below. 
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2. Definitions: column 1–8: Monthly 
household expenditures, including food self-consumption; column 9: the dependent variable consists of an index 
of z-scores of the outcome variables in columns 1–8 following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). p-values for this 
regression are reported using Hochberg’s correction method.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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We did not see any shift in the composition of household consumption that would 
support this hypothesis. Table 7 looks at other “empowerment” outcomes, namely, 
education and female empowerment. We find no impact on education, despite the 
reduction in outside labor among teenagers (other randomized controlled trials have 
found different effects, some finding positive and others negative impacts). 
Since the majority of borrowers of our sample are men, the expected effect on 
female empowerment is less clear cut than for standard microfinance programs, 
which tend to focus on women. Nevertheless, we do examine the impacts on female 
empowerment using several proxies. The first is the number of income-generating 
activities managed by a female household member (column 5). In remote rural 
areas, such activities are usually managed by male members (1.5 activities, on aver-
age, compared to 0.39 for women). We also use a series of qualitative indicators to 
describe female empowerment such as the capacity of women to make decisions, 
and their mobility inside and outside the villages. We construct a summary index of 
these qualitative variables (column 3) as they are part of the same “family” of out-
comes. We find no evidence of the effect of microfinance on any of these variables 
or on the index. 
These results are in line with the fact that only a small proportion of women bor-
row in remote rural areas and that additional borrowing for men is unlikely to change 
the bargaining power of women within the household. They are also consistent with 
the results from all the other microfinance evaluations except for Angelucci, Karlan, 
and Zinman (2013), which find improvements in female empowerment in Mexico. 
Table 7—Social effects
Share
of
kids aged 
6–15 in 
school
Share of 
teenagers 
(aged 16–20) 
in school
Index
of
women 
independencea
Share of
household with
self- employment
activities managed
by women
Number of 
self- employment 
activities
managed by 
women
Index
of
dependent 
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated village 0.004 −0.004 0.169 −0.014 −0.02 −0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.205) (0.009) (0.01) (0.012)
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
Control mean 0.453 0.088 −0.069 0.248 0.39 0.000
Hochberg-corrected
 p-value
>0.999
notes: Observation unit: household. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of 
the variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified 
below. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2. Column 6: the dependent vari-
able consists of an index of z-scores of the outcome variables in columns 1–5 following Kling, Liebman, and Katz 
(2007). p-values for this regression are reported using Hochberg’s correction method.
a  Effect on the sum of 14 standardized measures (measures include: at least one woman in the household has 
currently an own activity, decides by herself on activity assets, buys activity assets herself, decides by herself 
on activity inputs, buys inputs herself, decides what to produce, commercializes production, decides by herself 
on commercialization, makes sales herself, had an own activity in the past five years, is allowed to go to the 
market by herself, is allowed to take public transportation by herself, is allowed to visit family by herself, is 
allowed to visit friends by herself). Each measure is coded so that 1 reflects independence and 0 reflects lack 
of independence. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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III. Estimation of Externalities and Instrumental Variable Estimates
Section II presented reduced-form estimates of the impacts of access to micro-
credit on the specific population of households that were ex ante the most likely 
to become clients of Al Amana. We were also interested in two other questions: 
measuring impacts on the population as a whole, and disentangling direct effects on 
those who choose to borrow from indirect effects on others, such as general equi-
librium effects due to changes in prices, or changes in behavior stemming from the 
possibility to borrow in the future. We now exploit our experimental design to get 
at both questions. 
A. impact of Access to Microcredit over the Whole Population of Selected Villages
Measuring the impact of access to credit on the village population is straight-
forward given our design: we just reestimate the same set of regressions, but using 
the whole sample, and weighting appropriately using the sampling weights, so that 
the estimates are now representative at the village level. Those results are of course 
representative of the marginal villages selected to be in our experiment (and not of 
the entire catchment area of Al Amana branch). 
Table 8 presents the results for some key outcome variables. Panel A simply 
reproduces the results presented in Section II for the population of households likely 
to become clients of Al Amana (those who were in the top quartile of the propen-
sity score). Panel B presents intention-to-treat estimates on the same outcomes but 
over the whole population selected for the endline survey (the households in the top 
quartile plus the five randomly selected), weighted by the inverse of the probability 
to be selected in that population. 
Not surprisingly, take-up of microcredit is even smaller in this sample (13 per-
cent), although the relatively small (though statistically significant) difference with 
the “high-probability” sample underscores how difficult it is to predict who will 
take up microcredit. Correspondingly, the impact on most variables of interest is 
also smaller. However, even at the population level, still we find that microcredit 
access significantly increases sales and expenditures in the business. We also find 
significant declines in labor supplied outside the home and in salary income, and 
an insignificant decrease in consumption. There is now a negative and insignificant 
impact on profits: combined with the estimate on likely borrowers and the quan-
tile regressions, which did show significant negative treatment effects at the lowest 
quantiles, this suggests that those who are least likely to borrow are those with the 
most negative treatment effect on profit. 
B. Externalities
Prima facie, results in the previous section are not suggestive of strong exter-
nalities. We evaluate the effect of the treatment on the samples of households with 
high and low propensity to borrow. Finding no effect on the households who are 
predicted not to borrow is an indication that the no effect on nonborrowers (in the 
form of externalities and anticipation effects). In practice, we estimate the treatment 
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effect separately for those with the highest 30 percent and lowest 30 percent proba-
bility to borrow, and omit the middle group. 
To implement this test, we first reestimate the propensity to borrow based on 
actual endline behavior. By using actual borrowing behavior as measured by the end-
line  survey, instead of using the model based on only pilot phase 1, we increase the 
Table 8—Externalities
Weekly hours worked 
by HH members aged 
16–65
Client
Al Amana
- Admin
data
Assets 
(stock)
Sales
and
home 
consumption Expenses Profit
Income
from day 
labor/ 
salaried
Self-
employment Outside
Monthly
HH
consumption
(in MAD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Borrowers
Treated village 0.167 1,448 6,061 4,057 2,005 −1050 0.6 −3.0 −46
(0.012)*** (658)** (2,167)*** (1,721)** (1,210)* (478)** (1.3) (1.0)*** (47)
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,918 4,918 4,924
Control mean 0.000 15,984 30,450 21,394 9,056 15,748 40.6 30.4 3,057
Panel B. All sample weighted
Treated village 0.132 1,003 3,710 4,186 −476 −1234 0.5 −2.0 −44
(0.011)*** (705) (1,942)* (1,334)*** (1,252) (558)** 1.1 (1.1)* (36)
Observations 5,524 5,524 5,524 5,524 5,524 5,524 5,508 5,508 5,513
Control mean 0.000 15,493 26,376 17,263 9,113 15,911 39 30.0 2,927
Panel c. Top and bottom 30 percent unweighted
Treated village 0.363 1,033 15,774 10,171 5,603 −2,113 2.9 −7.0 −93
 × high predicted 
  propensity to
 borrow
(0.011)*** (1,296) (4,154)*** (3,555)*** (2,452)** (692)*** (2.3) (1.8)*** (94)
Treated village 0.015 1,612 647 1,013 −366 −2,453 −1.4 −6.2 82
 × low predicted
 propensity to
 borrow
(0.003)*** (1,132) (2,701) (1,737) (1,734) (795)*** (1.3) (1.6)*** (62)
Observations 3,315 3,315 3,315 3,315 3,315 3,315 3,303 3,303 3,307
Control mean 0.000 17,611 31,667 22,343 9,325 16,119 40.0 31.9 3,063
Control mean,
 high PTB
0.000 21,692 37,988 27,073 10,915 15,652 45.8 32.4 3,253
Control mean,
 low PTB
0.000 13,691 25,595 17,798 7,796 16,567 34.4 31.4 2,881
p-value: T × low PTB
 = T × high PTB
0.000 0.724 0.002 0.022 0.049 0.746 0.106 0.727 0.113
notes: Observation unit: household. Panel A: sample includes households with high probability-to-borrow score. 
Panel B: sample includes both households with high probability-to-borrow score and households picked at ran-
dom. Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of being sampled. Panel C: sample includes both house-
holds with high probability-to-borrow score and households picked at random, but only those in the top 30 percent 
and in the bottom 30 percent of the predicted propensity to borrow (PTB) distribution. All panels include sample 
after 0.5 percent trimming of observations. Panel A and B: coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from 
an OLS regression of the variable on a treated village dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and 
variables specified below. Panel C: coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of the 
variable on a treated village dummy interacted with a dummy equal to 1 if HH predicted propensity to borrow is in 
the 0–30th percentile of the PTB distribution (Low Predicted PTB), on a treated village dummy interacted with a 
dummy equal to 1 if HH predicted PTB is in the 70–100th percentile of the PTB distribution (High Predicted PTB) 
and on a dummy equal to 1 if HH predicted PTB is in the 0–30th percentile of the PTB distribution (not shown), 
controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified below. All panels: standard errors are clus-
tered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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 predictive power of the model. This is done by estimating a logit regression for the 
decision to become a client of Al Amana, using the set of baseline variables obtained 
from the initial short survey (which we collected at baseline well before the interven-
tion took place, and which we have for the entire population) and village dummies. 
This model is estimated on the whole set of households in treatment villages that were 
interviewed at endline. The results are presented in online Appendix Table B8. Several 
characteristics are individually significant in the regression, and they are also strongly 
significant taken together. The predicted probability to borrow ranges from almost 
0 to 0.80. It has an interquartile range of 20 percentage points, and a 37 percentage 
point difference between quantiles of order 90 percent and 10 percent. This allows 
us to identify reasonably well the heterogeneity related to the propensity to borrow. 
Panel C of Table 8 presents estimation results of the main equation with the two 
interaction terms (high and low propensity sample).13 Column 1 presents the results 
on the probability to borrow. Households in the high probability sample are 36 per-
centage points more likely to have taken a loan from Al Amana than their control 
counterparts. In the low-probability sample, the difference between treatment and 
control households is statistically different than 0 but very small (less than 2 percent-
age points). A caveat of our analysis is that a significant part of the  low-probability 
sample comes from villages where there is very little or no access to credit. Thus, 
the estimates on the low-probability sample capture the effect of credit availability 
in areas where microcredit was offered but where there is no demand and a combi-
nation of credit availability and spillover (from borrowers to non borrowers) effects 
in villages where some households took loans. 
Columns 2 to 9 present the results for the key outcome variables individually. 
For most outcomes, estimated values for the coefficient associated to the interaction 
between treatment and the low-probability sample are insignificant and generally 
fairly small. 
An interesting exception to the finding that externalities do not seem to be import-
ant arises from the variables on time worked by households outside the home and 
the income derived from it: there we see highly significant negative impacts on 
hours worked outside even among low-probability households. This is surprising, as 
prima facie we might have expected the externalities to run in the other direction (if 
those who borrow free up opportunities, leading to more jobs or increases in wages).
It could be that the ability to borrow (and thus to smooth out shocks if needed) 
reduces the need for income diversification. 
C. Local Average Treatment Effect
Motivated by the finding that externalities (except for labor supply) do not seem to 
be very important, we present suggestive estimates of the impact of  microcredit take-up 
on outcomes, using a dummy for residing in a treatment village as an  instrument for 
13 This equation is run without weights, to leverage to the maximum extent the power given to us by our design, 
which made sure we had enough people in the sample with relatively high probability to borrow. Under the null, 
OLS is BLUE and the regressions should not be weighted. With weights, we still reject the hypothesis of no exter-
nalities, but the results are noisier. 
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borrowing. This amounts to rescaling the reduced-form estimates by dividing them by 
0.17. Given how noisy the evidence on externality is, this is at best tentative; still, it is 
useful to get an order of magnitude of what the reduced-form evidence would entail. 
The equation we estimate is 
(2)   y pij = a + b C pij +  X pij c +  ∑ 
m=1
 
p
 γ m 1(p = m) +  u ij ,
where  C pij is a dummy variable corresponding to being a client of Al Amana. This 
equation is estimated using the treatment village dummy variable as an instrumental 
variable for  C pij , and for comparison by OLS. The IV strategy is valid only if the 
assumption of no externalities is correct. 
Table 9, panel B reports the IV estimates for the main outcome variables selected 
in Table 8. We present the means for compliers at the bottom of the table, as well as 
the control group means.14 
The IV estimates imply that, if the entire effect can indeed be attributed to borrow-
ers, the changes induced by Al Amana are large for those who do take up, although 
the orders of magnitude remain plausible. Assets (column 1) increase by 64 per-
cent, and production (column 2) increases by 153 percent compared to the compli-
ers’ mean. Similarly, expenses increase by 147 percent (column 3) and profits by 
168 percent (column 4). The reduction in weekly hours worked in employment activ-
ities and the derived income (columns 7 and 5) are also sizable, and both represent 
a substantial share of compliers’ mean (wage earnings decrease from 18,530 MAD 
to 12,249 MAD; hours of work decrease from 42 to 24 hours per week). 
If we assume that the impact on profits is entirely driven by borrowers, this sug-
gests large average returns to microcredit loans. In Table 3, we found that impact of 
the treatment dummy on profits is 2,005 MAD for the second year of the experiment 
(the profits are measured over the previous year). During that year, the average 
amount borrowed in the treatment group was 834 MAD (with an average maturity 
of 16 months).15. If we do not value any increase in hours worked, this suggests an 
average financial return to microcredit capital of 2.4, well above the microcredit 
interest rate. While this number is large, it is in line with prior estimates based on 
capital drop (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008), or for credit to larger firms 
(Banerjee et al. 2013). 
The impacts on consumption are small and relatively precise: we can reject with 
95 percent confidence that microcredit take-up increases consumption by more than 
10 percent. 
To assess the extent of heterogeneity in the treatment effect, we first estimate, 
under the maintained assumptions of no externality, the cumulative distribution of 
14 The complier mean in the control group is calculated as  E(y(0) | c) = [E(y | Z = 0) − E(y | Z = 1, T = 0) × 
(1 − P(T = 1))] / P(T = 1) , where Z indicates treatment assignment,  T indicates being a microcredit client and 
P(T = 1) the proportion of clients in  Z = 1 . 
15 This figure is the product of 9,500 MAD borrowed by people who borrowed, multiplied by 16.7 percent (the 
share of clients) and by 52.5 percent (the share of clients who are borrowing in the second year). See Table B5 in 
the online Appendix, where we estimate these figures on a subsample of clients who could be matched into the Al 
Amana administrative database. 
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potential outcomes (with and without treatment) for the compliers. The distribution 
F 1 of potential outcome when benefiting from the treatment is simply the cumulative 
distribution over the clients. Following (Imbens and Rubin 1997), the  counterfactual 
cumulative distribution  F 0 of potential outcome, when not benefiting from the treat-
ment for the compliers/clients, is given by16 
   F 0 (y | c) = (F(y | T = 0) − F(y | T = 1, c = 0)(1 − P(c))/P(c) .
16 We estimate the underlying cumulative distribution functions as step function with a large number of small 
intervals. Although the corresponding estimated function is asymptotically positive and increasing, a problem doc-
umented by (Imbens and Rubin 1997) is that the estimated function can fail to be either positive or increasing, and 
they propose a method to constrain the CDF to be nonnegative and increasing. Following them, we start the esti-
mation procedure with the first interval by applying the formula for unconstrained estimation and retaining either 
the estimated value if is positive, or zero otherwise. We then estimate the CDF recursively for all the other intervals 
by applying for each interval the formula for unconstrained estimation and retaining either the estimated value if 
greater than or equal to the estimated value in the preceding interval, or else the estimated value in the preceding 
interval. Finally, we rescale all estimates so that the cumulative distribution function reaches 1 on the last interval. 
Table 9—The Impact of Borrowing
Weekly hours worked by 
HH members aged 16–65
Assets 
(stock)
Sales 
+ home 
consumption Expenses Profit
Has a
self- 
employment 
activity
Income 
from day 
labor/
salaried
Self-
employment Outside
Monthly
HH 
consumption
(in MAD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. OLS
4,682 19,800 11,934 7,866 0.019 −1,263 6.6 −3.1 482
(1,870)** (7,758)** (5,580)** (4,122)* (0.016) (1,138) (3.0)** (3.1) (192)**
2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,440 2,440 2,444
16,524 31,182 21,574 9,608 0.816 15,127 39.2 27.8 2,947
Panel B. iV
Client 8,663 36,253 24,263 11,989 −0.091 −6,281 3.6 −18.2 −274
(4,008)** (12,494)*** (9,944)** (7,204)* (0.060) (2,866)** (8.0) (5.8)*** (278)
Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,918 4,918 4,924
Control mean 15,984 30,450 21,394 9,056 0.832 15,748 40.6 30.4 3,057
Control
 complier 
 mean a
13,568 23,703 16,551 7,152 0.900 18,530 43.5 42.1 3,421
notes: Observation unit: household. Panel A: Sample includes households with high probability-to-borrow score in 
treated villages. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS regression of the variable on a client 
dummy, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) and variables specified below. Client is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the household has borrowed from Al Amana. Panel B: Sample includes households with high probabil-
ity-to-borrow score in treated and control villages. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an instru-
mental variable regression of the variable on the variable client, controlling for strata dummies (paired villages) 
and variables specified below. client is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has borrowed from Al Amana 
and is instrumented with treated village, a dummy equal to 1 if the household lives in a treatment village. Standard 
errors are clustered at the village level. Same controls as in Table 2.
a  The complier mean in the control group is calculated as E(y(0) | c) = [E(y | Z = 0) − E(y | Z = 1, T = 0) 
× (1 − P(T = 1))]/P(T = 1),where Z indicates treatment assignment, T indicates being a microcredit client and 
P(T = 1) the proportion of clients in Z = 1
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Endline household survey
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Figure 2 presents the results.17 There are some interesting findings. First, while the 
distribution among compliers in the treatment group stochastically dominates that in 
the control for asset accumulation, and there is visibly no impact on consumption, 
the two curves are clearly different for profits: in the treatment groups, compliers 
have both more instances of low (negative) profits and high profits. Indeed, among 
the compliers in the control group, it seems that very few people have negative profit 
(the estimated CDF is very close to 0), while about 25 percent of compliers in the 
treatment group have negative profits. The two curves cross for a value of profits 
roughly equal to zero. On the other hand, the compliers with the top 40 percent of 
profits have higher profits in the treatment groups than in the control group. 
Turning to income from employment activities, Figure 2 shows that impact 
of being a client of Al Amana also appears to be far from homogeneous on the 
 population of compliers. As can be seen on the graph, there is no effect above the 
17 Note that we do not present confidence intervals, which would likely be wide, given that the first stage is not 
very large. 
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quantile of order 60 percent; all effects are concentrated at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. In particular, 45 percent of the compliers who are clients do not supply any labor 
outside their own activity, compared to only 30 percent for the nonclients. Similarly, 
a higher proportion of compliers rely less on day labor income in the treatment 
than in the control for low values (below 15,000 MAD) of the variables. This sug-
gests that the negative impact of credit on work supplied outside the home is driven 
primarily by households that do not rely heavily on casual labor in the first place. 
Last, Table 9, panel A, presents the results of the OLS control variable regression 
estimates obtained from a regression of our key outcomes on a dummy variable for 
being a client of Al Amana on the subsample of households in treatment villages. 
The differences of these estimates with the LATE estimates are sizable both in mag-
nitude and sign. This unsderscores the problems associated with identification of 
causal effect of microcredit. 
D. robustness checks
In this section, we briefly report on robustness checks. We experimented with 
changes in the list of control variables and different ways to compute standard errors. 
Results are presented in online Appendix Table B7. The first panel considers simple 
regressions just including the set of strata dummy variables, and the second panel 
reproduces our previous results, including a set of control variables listed in Table 2. 
This panel also provides standard errors computed assuming clustered residuals, as 
well as standard errors without clusters. The last panel provides results obtained by 
adding to the previous set of control variables an extended set involving, among oth-
ers, the dependent variable at baseline, as well as other variables listed in the foot-
note of Table B7. As can be seen from the table, results are very robust. We obtain 
the same order of magnitude for all estimated coefficients, as well as for standard 
errors. Expanding the list of control variables does not lead to any gain in precision. 
Finally, the clustered and unclustered errors in panel B are quite similar, suggesting 
that, in this case, clustering did not have a large impact on our standard errors. 
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we measure the impact of access to microfinance in remote rural 
areas in Morocco, where during the span of the intervention there was no access to 
credit outside that provided by our partner, Al Amana. 
We identified pairs of villages at the periphery of the catchment area of new 
branches, and randomly selected one village in each pair for treatment. We surveyed 
both households that were identified ex ante as having relatively higher probability 
to borrow, as well as randomly selected households in the village: the objective of 
this sampling strategy was to be able to estimate both direct impact and possible 
externalities on non borrowers. 
On average, take-up of microfinance is only 13 percent in the population and 
17 percent in our “higher probability” sample (and 0 in the control group). Consistent 
with other evaluations of microfinance programs, we find that households that have 
access to microcredit expand their self-employment activity ( primarily agriculture 
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or animal husbandry, in this context), and their profits increase. Our estimates seem 
to suggest that these effects are driven by those who actually borrow, implying that 
the modest reduced-form estimates actually come from fairly large average impacts 
(we estimate average returns to capital of close to 140 percent before repayment of 
interest) combined with a low take-up. 
This presents a puzzle: if the returns are really that high, why are people not borrow-
ing in larger numbers? And why are half of the clients apparently dropping out after 
a year? We see two plausible explanations. The first is that although microfinance is 
associated with large average increases in profits, the utility gain may not be as large 
as these estimate suggest: running one’s own business may be stressful (as Karlan and 
Zinman 2010 find in the Philippines). We may also not capture increase in labor in the 
household’s own business, which may be difficult for survey respondents to remember.
The second possible explanation is the substantial heterogeneity in how profit-
able microfinance investments are. Although noisy, both the reduced-form quantile 
regressions and the IV estimates of the changes in the distribution of profit for the 
outcomes suggest that for a substantial minority of households (about 25 percent of 
those who take up microcredit), the impact on profit may actually be negative. This 
large dispersion may explain the fairly low take-up of microfinance: households 
may recognize the unpredictable rate of return, and be risk averse. 
Another key finding is that despite significant increase in self-employment 
income (at least among the population that is most likely to borrow), we see no net 
impact of microcredit access on total labor income or on consumption. This result is 
similar to what other evaluations of microcredit programs find. In our context, this 
appears to be driven by a loss in income from wage labor, which is large enough to 
offset the gain in self-employment income, and is directly related to a substantial 
decline in labor supply outside the home by those who take up microcredit. What is 
surprising is that this does not appear to be driven by time constraints: the increase 
in labor supply on self-employment activities is small and insignificant, although the 
confidence intervals does not allow us to rule out an increase in hours spent.
There are two plausible channels for this set of results. The first is that access to 
microcredit allows households to invest in agriculture and animal husbandry and 
increase their profit. Leisure being a normal good, the income effect leads them 
to reduce their labor supplied, particularly outside the home. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that there is a strong disutility associated with day labor, giving credence 
to this explanation. A second possible channel is that our results reflect a shift in 
the way households cope with risk. Access to credit enables households to pur-
chase lumpy assets, such as livestock, which are typically used for self-insurance 
(Deaton 1991; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). This increased form of insurance can 
be a substitute of other ex ante risk-management strategies such as income diver-
sification through day labor, which are also taking place in the absence of formal 
insurance markets (Kochar 1999; Rose 2001). Regardless, microcredit appears to 
be a powerful financial instrument for the poor, but not one that fuels an exit from 
poverty through better self-employment investment, at least in the medium run (two 
years after the introduction of the program). We are currently following up with the 
households, now that a much longer time period has elapsed, to check if the invest-
ment in business assets paid off in the longer run.
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Appendix
Table A1. Propensity to Borrow
Propensity to borrow, all households interviewed at baseline in wave 1 treatment villages
Coef.
Does more than three self-employment activities 2.365
(0.734)***
Does trading as self-employment activity 0.846
(0.501)*
Share number of members with trading, services or handicraft as main activity to number of  
 members
3.125
(1.756)*
Owns land −1.588
(0.443)***
Rents land −1.992
(0.575)***
Have not bought agriculture productive assets over the past 12 months −1.048
(0.476)**
Uses sickle and rake (in agriculture) −0.979
(0.338)***
ln(# of olive and argan trees) 0.518
(0.096)***
# of cows bought over the past 12 months −2.010
(1.020)**
Gets a pension 2.021
(0.539)***
Has a radio 1.066
(0.403)***
Has a fiber mat 1.574
(0.650)**
Phone expenses over the past month (in MAD) −0.019
(0.006)***
Clothes expenses over the past month (in MAD) 0.001
(0.001)*
Had an outstanding formal loan over the past 12 months 0.869
(0.330)***
ln(amount that would be able to reimburse monthly (in MAD)) 0.250
(0.109)**
Would be ready to form a 4-person group and guarantee a loan mutually 0.570
(0.321)*
Would uptake a loan of 3,000 MAD to be repaid in 9 monthly installments of 400 MAD 0.593
(0.338)*
Observations 665
Mean dependent variable 0.104
Pseudo r2 0.280
Number of villages 7
notes: Unit of observation: household. Sample includes all households surveyed at baseline in phase 1 pilot treat-
ment villages (i.e. wave 1). Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a logit regression of the vari-
able client on variables specified in the table. Client is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household had taken up a 
microcredit within the first 6 months of the intervention.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Mini survey
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